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DEFINING FEMINISM, DEFINING FEMINISMS 
REGINALD Ott' 
It is fitting that the first chapter of this wonderful Symposium is entitled 
"Defining Feminism." That is because the struggle of subordinated persons 
and groups is, at its heart, the struggle for subordinated persons and groups 
to be able to define the reality and truth of their lived experiences, to be able 
to define and validate the truth of one's reality in the face of pervasive racist, 
sexist, classist, and homophobic messages. 
Why? Women, people of color, the poor, and gays and lesbians are 
constantly having their experiential reality discounted, devalued, rejected, 
and ignored. They are constantly being told that their problems with racism, 
sexism, classism, heterosexism, are just "all in their head." For example, 
women are told by men to stop "complaining" about gender inequality 
because women need to accept that inequalities between the sexes flow from 
natural differences between the sexes. People of color are told by whites that 
they are being racist and "playing the race card" whenever they identify 
patterns of institutionaJized racism. Within such a context, to be able to 
define one's own reality is the first step in the process of constructing a 
contextualized identity that can enable and empower subordinated peoples 
in their struggle for liberation and recognition as autonomous human 
beings. 
The harm of having one's life defined through the experiential lens of 
another is to be treated as an "It" in theologian Martin Buber's terminology.' 
Buber contrasts what he calls an "I-It" relationship with an "I-Thou" 
relationship.2 In the "I-It" relationship, one person treats another person as 
an "it," an object to be categorized and controlled to advance the self­
interests of the "l."3 Within an "I-It" relationship, a person fails to 
acknowledge, recognize, and honor the autonomous being that stands across 
from him or her. The person refuses to see the other person except but in 
·Assistant Professor of Law, Appalachian School of Law. I want to thank Maria Grahn-Farley for 
having invited me to participate in this symposium. I am also grateful to David Butle Richie for 
his very helpful comments. Finally, I want to give special thanks to Anthony Paul Farley and 
Phyllis Goldfarb, my mentors and teachers on race and gender issues. 
I MARTIN BUBER, I AND THOU (Ronald Gregor Smith trans., Charles Scribner's Sons 2d ed. 
1958). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
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his or her own pre-defined image ofwhat the other person is or should be. 
In contrast, Buber describes an "I-Thou" relationship as one in which a 
person recognizes and treats the other person as the free, autonomous 
human being that she or he is.4 In an "I-Thou" relationship, the "I" does not 
attempt to make or recreate the "Thou" into the "I's" image of who the 
"Thou" should or should not be. In an "I-Thou" relationship, the "I" lets go 
of trying to judge and control the other person's beliefs, thoughts, and 
emotions, and tries to learn and accept the other person's experience, her 
truth, her reality. 
W.E.B. Dubois has articulated and described with intense clarity the 
insidious psychic harm of having one's self constantly defined by others 
through the lens of racism. 
[T]he Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with 
second-sight in this American world,-a world which yields him no 
true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the 
revelation of the other world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double­
consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the 
eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that 
looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness,­
an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled 
strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength 
alone keeps it from being torn asunder. 
The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife-this 
longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self 
into a better and truer self. ... 5 
In articulating the insidious harm of "double-consciousness," Dubois was 
describing the painful feeling and experience of a being viewed as a 
racialized "It" by white society.6 Dubois' notion of "double-consciousness," 
the "sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others," 
describes the inner reality and mindset of a person who lives in a society 
where he or she is pervasively treated as an "It."7 
Several decades after Dubois talked about "double-consciousness," 
Martin Luther King Jr. theorized about how the "I-It''. relationship between 
whites and blacks manifested itself in institutional, systemic form through the 
practice of racial segregation.8 In his "Letter from A Birmingham Jai~" King 
wrote, 
4 Id. 
5 W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE SOUL.S OF BLACK FOLK 5 (Penguin Books 1996) (1903). 
6 Id. 
7 Id. 
8 MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 85 (Harper & Row Publishers 1964). 
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All segregation statutes are unjust because segregation distorts the 
soul and damages the personality. It gives the segregator a false sense 
of superiority and the segregated a false sense of inferiority. 
Segregation, to use the terminology of. . . Martin Buber, substitutes 
an "I-It" relationship for an "I-Thou" relationship and ends up 
relegating persons to the status of things.9 
Thus, both King and Dubois understand that whites, in viewing African 
Americans as racial inferiors and in segregating and invidiously 
discriminating against African Americans, were treating African Americans as 
objects, as "Its."10 
The "It" consciousness is one that all subordinated groups have 
experienced. Historically, with regard to gender relations, the "I-It" 
relationship has paradigmatically taken the I (Man) - It (woman) dynamic, a 
dynamic that still continues to repeat itself with consistent persistency to this 
day, although this dynamic now continues within the superficial structures of 
a formalistic "equal opportunity" society that is equal mainly in terms of law 
but still unequal when the concrete reality of the experience of women is 
examined. Thus, a woman experiences "double-consciousness" when she 
self-consciously experiences the feeling of looking at her self through the 
eyes of men, and ends up judging and condemning her self through those 
same external eyes. In short, a person experiencing double consciousness 
ends up treating him or herself as an object, as an "It." 
To move towards full substantive equality and liberty for all, it is 
necessary for members of subordinated groups, to paraphrase Dubois, to 
"merge his or her double self into" an integrated, autonomous self. 11 To that 
end, a first step for subordinated peoples is to first realize that racist and 
sexist messages that they have heard all their lives do not define the true 
essence of their selfhood. 
Hence, Feminists urgently need to define Feminism and to construct 
feminist theories that validate and affirm the truth of women's lived 
experience, in all their multiplicity and diversity. Because feminist theories 
are forged through the diverse experiences of differently situated women, it 
is respectfully suggested that the title of this Chapter may and can be seen as 
the call to define Feminism and Feminism(s). Defining feminism(s) means, 
in spirit of the "I-Thou" relationship, being mindful and respectful that 
individual Feminists will define Feminism in alignment with the truth of 
their unique experience, in alignment with the truth of their unique reality. 
Viewing the call to define feminism as the call to define feminism(s), 
we can better understand the call for anti-essentialism in feminist and critical 
9 See id. 
10 See id.; Du Bors supra note 5, at 5. 
II Id. 
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race theory. 12 The call for anti-essentialism is a recognition that attempts to 
declare one experiential perspective (this issue is about racism.0 as being the 
correct perspective over another perspective (therefare, this issue is not about 
sexism.0, is an attempt to assert privileged status and in the process, is treating 
fellow autonomous humans as "Its," as objects. The desire to define and 
essentialize others, therefore, is simply another manifestation of racial and 
gender hierarchy and domination. 
Too often, however, the consensus that we need to hear and 
understand subordination from multiple perspectives gets lost in territorial 
fights to claim an experience as the exclusive or primary experience of one 
group over another. Such territorial in-fighting occurs when people are 
locked in an "I-It" relationship. In an "I-It" relationship, one group seeks to 
impose its definition and understanding of a situation or issue upon others. 
In this situation, it becomes impossible to construct and create inter­
subjective knowledge through a mutual exchange and sharing of differing 
personal, experiential, emotional, and cognitive perspectives. On the 
contrary, people stuck within an "I-It" relationship end up stifling the 
construction of a truly inter-subjective knowledge that incorporates the full 
range of human experiences and perspectives. 
What does it mean to go about the task of defining Feminisms? It 
means, for one thing, that we ought to ask what we can learn about systems 
of subordination by viewing such systems from multiple perspectives. 
Jacqueline Mertz's essay, for example, discusses the Yvonne Wanrow case 
from both a feminist and Native American perspective, without attempting to 
define one perspective as the "true" perspective, and the other perspective as 
a subordinate or tangential perspective. 13 From this inclusive, multiple 
orientation approach, Mertz asks us: What can and do we learn about one 
another by viewing this issue from the perspective of feminist theory? What 
do we learn about one another by viewing this issue from the perspective of a 
Native American? What do we learn about one another by viewing this issue 
from the perspective of a Native American woman? In reading her article, 
one wonders whether it is possible for defense attorneys to construct legal 
defenses that take the perspective of Native American women, taking into 
full consideration the multidimensional subordination14 Native American 
12 See generally Elizabeth V. Spelman, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN 
FEMINIST THOUGHT 19 (1988); Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of 
Race: The Implication of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism ( M Other -isms), 1991 DUKE 
LJ. 397 (1991); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 
581 (1990). 
13 See Jacqueline Mertz, Women of ColM-What Their Voices Teach Us, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN'S 
LJ.205 (2003). 
14 The term "multidimensional subordination" is borrowed from Professor Darren 
Hutchinson. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: "lntersectionality," 
"Multidimensionality," and the Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & 
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women have experienced in the United States. 
Similarly, Kimberly Charles, based on her experience and perspective, 
seeks to construct a Feminism rooted in the teachings of Christianity. 15 She 
insightfully deconstructs the sexism in Fundamentalist Christian beliefs, to 
help show that sexism is not an intrinsic aspect of Christianity. In doing so, 
she opens up the possibility of developing a Christian theology that seeks to 
end the subordination of women, and opens up the possibility of speaking to 
and raising feminist consciousness among women and men of Christian 
faith. 
This Symposium is an insightful step in the process of defining 
Feminism(s). I have learned much in reading these articles, and I hope to 
engage in future dialogue with these Feminist legal theorists. 
LAW285 (2001). 

15 See Kimberly Charles, Sexism is a "Family Value, "9 CARDOZO WOMEN'S LJ. 255 (2003). 
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